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Abstract: We propose a quantum copy-protection system which protects 
classical information in the form of non-orthogonal quantum states. The 
decryption of the stored information is not possible in the classical 
representation and the decryption mechanism of data qubits is realized by 
secret unitary rotations. We define an authentication method for the proposed 
copy-protection scheme and analyse the success probabilities of the 
authentication process. A possible experimental realization of the scheme is 
also presented.  
 
1    Introduction 
 
In classical computer science, any data that can be read can be copied an unlimited 
number of times. There is no theoretical limit on the copying of classical data 
within classical communication. The best solution we can expect is that the media 
that carry these data should not be duplicable. On the other hand, the rise of 
quantum information processing reveals that with quantum information a higher 
level of security can be expected. The entertainment and classical computer 
industry use every technical and legal means possible to prevail against pirates and 
the main purpose is to implement widespread copy prevention of digital files. 
However, cloning a quantum state is an impossible task and this is called the no-
cloning theorem (Wootters and Zurek, 1982). The no-cloning theorem was first 
shown by Wooters and Zurek and this theory is closely concerned with other 
quantum information processing such as state estimation and quantum cloning. In 
the quantum world, the quantum states cannot be copied perfectly, according to 
the no-cloning theorem (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000). The proposed quantum-based 
data protection system uses the fundamental difference between classical and 
quantum information (Imre and Balazs, 2005). The classical data are stored in the 
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secret rotation angles of non-orthogonal quantum states. We show that secret 
quantum decoding operations can be implemented with some associated error, 
which decreases exponentially with the number of quantum states of the angle 
state.  
2    Quantum encryption 
In the classical world, copy-protecting is trivially impossible. In this paper we show 
a new quantum-based data protection system, which stores the classical data inside 
the encoded quantum states on the data medium. In the proposed quantum-based 
data protection system, Alice can always read the classical data, while no one but 
the original Issuer knows the original quantum states that carry these classical 
data. Even though an unauthorized user can try to copy some other quantum 
states storing the same classical data, these quantum states can be distinguished 
from the original ones. The classical data are stored in quantum states, whose 
states are perfectly readable by Alice or any user. Although the classical data is 
readable by anyone, these classical bits are encoded bits, thus Alice or any user 
needs a decryption key to decode the information. The secret quantum information 
is stored in the rotation angles of the qubits. In the authentication process, the 
system verifies the decoding quantum key, which is stored on the data medium. 
The method uses non-orthogonal quantum states, furthermore both secret key 
states and data states are non-orthogonal quantum states (Imre and Balazs, 2005).  
2.1   Encoding by polarization angle of quantum bits  
In this paper, we will concentrate on the basic idea of the proposed quantum-based 
data protection system, in the absence of errors caused by technical problems. 
Although with the implementation of quantum error correcting codes the proposed 
scheme can be adjusted to fit realistic settings. The quantum states used are non-
orthogonal quantum states, the polarization of quantum bits is rotated by a certain 
angle (Imre and Balazs, 2005).  
Figure 1  The secret rotation angle of a quantum state 
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The classical data are stored on the data medium by these non-orthogonal 
quantum states. If the Issuer stores a classical n-bit string, he randomly chooses 
angle  for every classical bit and prepares the quantum state )0,2iq éÎ ë p
cos 0 si iy q= in 1iq+
p
. The Issuer writes all these n quantum states to the 
data medium, while keeping all )0,2iq éÎ ë  secret. If Alice receives the quantum 
based data medium from the Issuer, she runs a simple reading mechanism to read 
the classical data on the data medium. For every quantum state, she measures the 
quantum state iy  with the projection operator 0 0 1 1= + .  
The result of the linear operator 0 0=   acting on an unknown 
0y a b= + 1  quantum state, projects the state iy  into state 0  with 
probability 2a , while the linear operator 1 1=   projects into state 1  with 
probability 2b  (Imre and Balazs, 2005). The components not in the sub-vector 
space are discarded. Alice can use projector  to filter out everything other than 
the subspace she is looking for (Imre and Balazs, 2005). If Alice has a pirated data 
medium, she wants to project a false quantum state  
 
* *cos 0 sin 1i i iq q q= + *   (1) 
into a valid  
cos 0 sin 1i i iq q q= +   (2) 
state, however she can only do this with a non-zero error rate . Alice can make 
an arbitrary projective measurement in the XZ plane, however the projected 
quantum states can only pass the verification process with probability ( ) , 
which becomes exponentially small as the length of the string increases . Thus, if 
Alice has a pirated disk, she cannot decode the quantum states correctly, and she 
gets only useless garbage data. The quantum state 
e
1
ne-
iq  can never be cloned 
perfectly because the angle  is kept secret from Alice and others and it can be 
varied within the range éë . To conclude the purpose of the proposed system, 
Alice can retrieve perfectly the encoded classical data stored in the quantum states 
on the data medium without the help of the provider (Brassard et al. 2007).  
iq
)2p0,
 
In Figure 2 we illustrate the situation if Alice sends her angle state to the Issuer, 
who verifies the angle of the sent quantum state. 
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Figure 2  Verification of non-orthogonal quantum state  
Issuer
Quantum Data Medium  0,2i 
 0,2i   
 
Only the provider can check whether the quantum states on the data medium 
are original or not, and only the provider knows the decryption key for the encoded 
quantum states. Thus, Alice gains no benefit from the knowledge of the classical 
data stored on the data medium, because these bits are encoded bits and the 
decoding key is operating on quantum states. 
3     Quantum-based data medium authentication  
The data states and secret key states are encrypted by secret rotation angles. In 
order to read the disguised quantum bits correctly, Alice must rotate the i-th data 
quantum bit by the secret angle  in the opposite direction to the Issuer. We can 
assume for example, that our data state 
iq
0d a b= + 1
0
, where a  and b  are 
complex coefficients, is a single quantum bit encoded by the rotation operator 
 This rotation operator in matrix form is: ( )0 .q
( ) 00
0 0
cos sin
.
sin cos
q qq q q
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= ÷ç ÷- ÷çè ø
  (3) 
The copy-protection of these rotation angles relies on the no-cloning theorem 
(Wootters and Zurek, 1982). If a superposition state is measured, the result will be 
one of two orthogonal states and no information regarding the rotation angle is 
left. In the authentication method, both the data states, and the data decryption 
keys are non-orthogonal states. We will describe this method in this paper further 
on.  
The security of the proposed scheme relies on the no-cloning theorem (Wootters 
and Zurek, 1982). Contrary to classical information, in a quantum communication 
system the quantum information cannot be copied perfectly. If Alice sends a 
number of photons 1 2, , , Ny y y  through the quantum channel, an 
eavesdropper is not interested in copying an arbitrary state, only the possible 
polarization states. To copy the sent quantum state, an eavesdropper has to use a 
quantum cloner machine, and a known “blank” state 0 , onto which the 
eavesdropper would like to copy Alice’s quantum state. If Eve wants to copy the i-
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th sent photon iy , she has to apply a unitary transformation U, which gives the 
following result:  
( )0i iU y yÄ = Ä ,iy                                      (4) 
for each polarization state of qubit iy . A photon chosen from a given set of 
polarization states can only be perfectly cloned if the polarization angles in the set 
are distinct, and are all mutually orthogonal (Imre and Balazs, 2005). The 
unknown non-orthogonal states cannot be cloned perfectly, the cloning process of 
the quantum states is possible only if the information being cloned is classical, 
hence the quantum states are all orthogonal. The polarization states are not all 
orthogonal states, which makes it impossible for the eavesdropper to copy the 
sender’s quantum states (Brassard, 2006).  
3.1    Brief overview of quantum information processing  
In this section, we give a brief overview of quantum mechanics, and we introduce 
the basic notation which will be used in the text. In quantum information 
processing, the logical values of classical bits are replaced by state vectors 0  and 
1 , which is the Dirac notation. Contrary to classical bits, a qubit y  can also be 
in a linear combination of basis vectors  0  and 1 . The state of a qubit can be 
expressed as 0y a b= + 1 , where a  and  are complex numbers, this is 
also called the superposition of the basis vectors, with probability amplitudes a  
and  (Imre and Balazs, 2005). A qubit 
b
b y  is a vector in a two-dimensional 
complex space, where the basis vectors 0  and 1  form an orthonormal basis. 
The orthonormal basis { 0 , 1 }  forms the computational basis (Imre and Balazs, 
2005). The vectors or states 0  and 1  can be expressed in matrix representation 
by 
1
0
0
é ùê ú= ê úê úë û
 and 
0
1 .
1
é ùê ú= ê úê úë û
  (5)  
If 2a  and 2b  are the probabilities, and the number of possible outputs is only 
two, then for 0y a b= + 1  we have 2 2 1a b+ = , and the norm of y  is 
2 2
1y a b= + = . The most general transformation that keeps constraint 
y  is a linear transformation U , that transforms unit vectors into unit vectors. 
A unitary transformation (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) can be defined as  
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† † ,U U UU I= =  (6) 
where , hence the adjoint is equal to the transpose of the complex 
conjugate and I  is the identity matrix (Imre and Balazs, 2005). The state 
( )† * TU U=
y  of 
an n-qubit quantum register is a superposition of the 2  states n
0 , 1 , , 2 1 ,n -  thus 
2 1
0
,
n
i
i
iy a
-
=
= å  with amplitudes  constrained to ia
2 1
2
0
1.
n
i
i
a
-
=
=å  The state of an n-qubit length quantum register is a vector in a -
dimensional complex vector space, hence if the number of qubits in the quantum 
register increases linearly, the dimension of the vector space increases exponentially 
(Nielsen, Chuang, 2000).  
2n
A complex vector space V  is a Hilbert space , if there is an inner product 
y j  with  and ,x y Î  , , ,u v Vj y Î  defined by rules of 
*
,y j j y=  ( ) ,a v b v a u b vj j j+ = +  and 0j j >  if 
0.j ¹  If we have vectors 0 1a b= +j  and 0 1c dy = + , then the 
inner product in matrix representation can be expressed as  
* * * * .
c
a b a c b d
d
j y
é ùé ù ê ú= =ê ú ê úë û ê úë û
+   (7) 
The outer product between two vectors j  and y can be defined as y j , 
satisfying ( ) vy j y j= v  (Imre and Balazs, 2005). The matrix of the 
outer product y j  is obtained by the usual matrix multiplication of a column 
matrix by a row matrix, however the matrix multiplication can be replaced by a 
tensor product, since .j y j y= Ä If we have vectors 0 1a bj = +  
and 0c dy = + 1 , the outer product in matrix representation can be 
expressed as  
* *
* *
* *
.
a ac
c d
b bc bd
j y ad
é ùé ù ê úé ùê ú= = ê úê úê ú ë û ê úê úë û ë û
   (8) 
In Figure 3, we illustrate the general model of an n-length quantum register, where 
the   input state iy  is either 0  or 1 , generally. After the application of a 
unitary transformation U  on the input states, the state of the quantum register 
can be given by state vector y . The unitary operator U is a  matrix, 
with – in principle – an infinite number of possible operators. 
2 2n ´ n
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Figure 3   General sketch of an n-length quantum register 
 
1
1
2
n
 U 
 
 
The result of the measurement of state y  results in zeros and ones that form the 
final result of the quantum computation, based on the n-length qubit string stored 
in the quantum register (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000). 
3.2    Storing information in rotation angles 
We distinguish data 0d a b= + 1  qubit states from secret key  
1 2 ny q q q= Ä Ä Ä     (9) 
qubit states on the data medium. The decryption mechanism is realized by secret 
unitary rotations, therefore the required secret is stored in the rotation angles of 
the key qubits. Alice takes the data quantum states from the data medium and her 
i-th qubit is valid iff the qubit can be projected into (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000), 
(Kim et al., 2002).  
cos 0 sin 1 .dq q q= +     (10) 
Thereby the data string is valid iff all the qubits from the string can be projected 
successfully. Thus, if Alice wants to copy an original string from the data medium, 
she has to know all the , secret rotation angles. In the proposed 
system, Alice has a chance not greater than  to read the states 
exactly from the data medium, because she doesn’t know the original rotation 
angle of the i-th qubit . We would consider approximate those transformations 
where the output state of the transformation is only an approximation to 
,  1, ,i iq =  n
q( )2sin ie =
iq
cos 0 sindq q= + 1 .q  If the angle transformation does succeed, the output 
state becomes .dq  The  a priori probability of decryption success depends 
both on the data quantum state 
dpq
d  and on the quality of the stored rotation 
operation  (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000). Thus, the quality of the proposed 
quantum-based decryption transformation is quantified by the average of a priori 
q
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probability ( )
2
.
2
d
C
d
p d d q
q
p= ò ò p  Since we have only one qubit to encode the 
rotation operation the angle state  ,q 2 21 0
2
i i
e e
q q
q -
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= + ÷ç ÷ç ÷çè ø
1   can be used to 
store this  The decryption method’s control qubit corresponds to the data qubit .q
d , while the target qubit is equal to the decryption key state q . Thus, using a 
simple CNOT transformation (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000), the state is transformed to 
( )†0 1 ,
2
d d dq qq Ä + Ä 1Ä   and therefore a projective 
measurement in the { 0 , 1 }  basis of the program register will make the data 
qubit collapse either into the desired state dq  or into the wrong state † dq  
(Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000).    
4    Data states and key states on data medium   
We store unitary operation  in the rotation angle 
iq iq . This transformation can 
be performed on a data qubit by an arbitrary system almost perfectly. In the 
proposed system, we use data states 1 nd Ä Ä d , and decryption key states 
,1 ,D D
y
n
y Ä Ä , where ii qq =   and the i-th bit of the key operates on 
0 1i i id a b= + , where  and  are complex coefficients (Acín, Jané and 
Vidal, 2000). The i-th key transformation is applied on 
ia ib
id , so the manipulation 
of the joint state i id qÄ  does not require knowing the operation  nor the 
data state 
iq
.id  Thus, Alice or an arbitrary user who has a valid quantum 
protected data medium is able to transform the data and key state into 
( ),i ii ddq cÄ  q ,  where ( ), id qc   is just some residual state. Thus, if Alice 
reads the data medium, the result of the action 
iq  an arbitrary data state  on id  
etermined by the secret decryption key state is d iq  (A , Jané and Vidal, 2000). 
Let 
cín
the secret, one-qubit key state unitary operation be ( )/2zie qsq º
y rotation aro
,  for an 
arbitrary angle )0,2q péÎ ë , which corresponds to an arbitrar und the 
zˆ -axis of a spin  (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000). The secret key state can also 
 given by 
 ½ particle
be ( )1 0 1i ie eq qq -= + ,  which is prepared by the Issuer, applying 
2
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q  on the q position state. The Issuer also prepares and ubit in the standard super
to the data medium another qubit writes 0 1d a b= + , along with the key 
state q .  
 
Figure 4  The Issuer puts data state and key quantum state on the quantum disk 
 
Issuer
Data state
Key state
Quantum Data Medium
 
 
If Alice buys a valid data medium from a store and she tries to read the 
quantum-protected data medium at home, she doesn’t know the secret key q  nor 
the complex coefficients a  and b . However she can read the data medium 
successfully, because she is able to prepare the decrypted state dq  from the 
unknown projected but still unmeasured encrypted data and the projected but still 
unmeasured unknown secret key. 
The readout process of the superposition quantum states and the encryption 
process might be controlled by Alice’s quantum-CPU with a pre-prepared Quantum 
 
Instruction List stored on the medium. Alice’s encryption process is defined only in 
the angles of quantum states in the Hilbert space .  The secret rotations are 
implemented by a quantum-CPU in Alice’s reader device with a data and program 
register. The data register contains the readout data quantum states, while the 
program register contains the readout key states. The device’s quantum processing 
unit uses the readout non-orthogonal quantum states stored in the data and 
program register (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000). 
Figure 5  The readout process and the execution of the readout quantum program 
on the data state 
QUANTUM DATA MEDIUM QUANTUM CPU
QUANTUM
DATA 
REGISTER
QUANTUM 
PROGRAM 
REGISTER
0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 1 
0 1d   
0 1   
DATA STATE
PROGRAM STATE
OUT PROJECTION
READOUT PROJECTION
READ
QUANTUM
DATA 
REGISTER
QUANTUM 
PROGRAM 
REGISTER
d
M
DECRYPTED 
DATA STATE
MEASUREMENT
 
The quantum CPU’s data register contains the readout data quant e 
 program register contains the readout key states. The de ce’s quantum 
 
e
um states, whil
vith
processing unit uses the readout non-orthogonal quantum states stored in the data 
and program register. 
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4.1    Decrypting unknown data with unknown secret key 
In order to implement the unknown unitary transformation  on unknown data  q
state d , Alice has to perform a CNOT operation (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000), taking 
the data qubit in a valid state d  as the control-qubit and th secret key qubit in 
state 
e 
q  as the target-qubit. The CNOT gate 0 0 1 1 ,xI sÄ + Ä  where xs  
is the Pauli X-transformation (Imre and Balazs, 2005), permutes the 0  and 1  
states  the target only if the control qubit is of in state 1  (Acín, Jané and Vid  
2000). The two-qubit state is transformed to  
al,
( )†1 0 1 .
2
d d dq qqÄ  Ä + Ä   (11) 
Therefore, a projective measurement on the basis { }0 , 1
the desired state 
 of the decryption key 
state will make the data qubit collapse either into d  or into q
the wrong state † dq , with each outcome havin bility of 1/2  (Nielsen, 
Chuang, 2000). If Alice obtains the wrong result 
g proba
† dq , then fails at 
performing the wished operation and will be unable to read the data medium 
correctly. In order to construct a more efficient solution, we use multi-qubit secret 
key states (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000), (Kim et al., 2002). 
 
Let us assume that Alice measures the i-th qubit in the basis 
 she 
{ }0 , 1  and 
gets the data state * * *0 1id a b= + , where  and  are complex 
coe ootters
ot determine and co
*a
 e
*b
in
fficients. Due to the no-cloning theorem of quantum states (W  and 
Zurek, 1982), Alice cann py the state xactly s ce she does not 
know the angle iq . Thus, she cannot be sure whether the i-th readout quantum 
state *id  is identical to the original data state id  or not. Thus, if Alice tries to 
copy the state, she picks up another angle iq  and she prepares a fake state 
* * *s 0 sin 1 .i i iq q q= +  Now, Alice has a chance that co *i id d=  with 
probability ( )2cos iq , and has a chance th t a *i id d¹  with probability 
e state ( )2sin iq . Therefore, a fak *q  can be projected to t l state i he origina
cos 1q q q= +  successfully with probabil
i i i i+
0 ini i i ity  
)  (12) 
s
( ) (2 2 * 2 2 *cos cos sin sin .i i ip q q q q q q= - +
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In the proposed system, the rotation angles are evenly distributed and the 
maximum of the average probability ip  can be reached if the angle of state 
*
iq  is 
equal to zero (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000). Thus, the best she can do after sh as 
measured the qubit which is stored on the data medium is to leave it as it is after 
the measurement. In this case, she gets the correct iq  with probability  
 
e h
21   1 sin 2 ,
2i i
p q= -  (13) 
therefore Alice’s total pr ability of coping with  quantum states with ob valid n
rotation angles iq  is  
2
1
1
1 sin 2
2
.i
i
P q
=
ö÷ç= - ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø     (14) 
Thus, by increasing n, Alice’s probability of success can be made arbitrarily 
tate realized by multi-qubit string 
f the proposed 
n æ
small 
(Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000).  
4.2    One-qubit secret key s
In this section we show the data storage and decryption method o
system. The one-qubit secret key state cos 0 sin 1q q q= +  is realized by a 
multi-qubit string, which is stored on the ails to decode the 
data qubit, a second go can correct the wrong state 
data medium. If Alice f
† dq  into the right state 
dq  (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000).  
ore, Alice needs to apply Theref the gate in Figure 6 to prepare the bad state 
† dq  or the right state dq  with equal probability 1/2. If Alice wants to 
e her probability of s s, she has to insert a new key angle state increas ucces 2q , 
which is prepared and stored on the data medium by the Issuer. To prepare e 
state 
th
2q , the Issuer needs only to perform the operation q  twice on a qubit in a 
standard superposition state (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000), (Kim et al., 2002). The 
Issuer writes the key state 2q qÄ  to the data medium in order to get the right 
decrypted state dq . Thus, if the 2q  state is available on the data medium for 
Alice’s second attempt, n perform the rig q  transformation on data qubit she ca ht 
d  with probability 3/4. 
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Figure 6   The decryption of a single-qubit data with single-qubit key state. The 
secret angle state is stored in one qubit 
 M
dd

 
 
In case of a new failure, the state of the system becomes † 3 dq . The 
improved gate in Figure 7 contains a Toffoli-gate, which acts as a CNOT-gate 
(Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) between the first and third line of the circuit only if the 
second line carries a 1  state. If the second line carries 1 , this means that the 
previous measurement on key state q  failed. In the case of a new failure, Alice 
can correct it by inserting this state again, together with state 4q  (Acín, Jané 
and Vidal, 2000).  
Figure 7   The decryption of a single-qubit data with multi-qubit key states. The 
secret angle state is stored in two quantum states 
 M
dd

2 M2  
 
If Alice has no luck and keeps on failing, she can try to correct the state as many 
times as she wishes, provided that the state 12l q-  is available on the data 
medium for the l-th attempt. Therefore, an l-qubit state 11 2
l i
i q-=Ä  can be used 
to implement the secret transformation  on the corresponding data qubit q d  
with probability  Thus, Alice takes data qubit ( )1 1 / 2 l- . d  as the control bit, 
and takes decrypting qubit states 11 2
l i
i q-=Ä  as the target, therefore Alice’s 
reader device evolves the transformation of  11 2
l i
id q-=Ä  into  
( )2 1 †1
2 1 
2
l
l
l
d right d wrongq q
-æ ö÷ç - Ä + Ä ÷ç ÷çè ø  ,           (15) 
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and a posterior measurement of the secret key states either in the right  or 
wrong  state, where 0.right wrong =  Since the Issuer gives an l-length key 
1
1 2
l i
i q-=Ä  to decode data state d , Alice’s probability of failure will be 
 and it decreases exponentially with the size of the (1 / 2 le = ) q  decrypting 
state’s secret string length l  (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000), (Kim et al., 2002). This 
gate is shown in Figure 8. 
Figure 8   The decryption of single-qubit data with multi-qubit key state. The 
secret angle state is stored in an l-length quantum string 
 M
dd

2 M2
22l  M22l 
12l  M12l 
  
 
 
In Figure 9, Alice’s simplified quantum circuit is equivalent to the previous gate, 
since it takes the unknown data state d  as the control, and the unknown secret 
key state q  as the target of the CNOT-gate (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000). Depending 
on the result of a measurement on the key qubit state, Alice produces either 
dq  or † dq .  
Figure 9   The decryption of single-qubit data with key qubit state. The short 
diagonal line on the bottom line indicates that the secret key bit state consists of 
several quantum bits 
 M
dd

 
 
The verification uses an l-qubit for the realization of every secret q  rotation 
angle. Thus, every rotation transformation  succeeds with probability q
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(1 1 / 2 lp = - ) ), with error probability  (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000). 
Since the Issuer writes only a one-state decryption key to the data medium, Alice 
fails to perform 
(1 / 2 le =
dq  with probability  If the Issuer writes a two-
qubit decryption key state to the data medium, Alice fails with probability 
 etc. The average length of the required string is  
1 1 / 2.p =
2 1 / 4,p =
1 1
2.
2
l l
l l
l
l p l
¥ ¥
= =
= = =å å  (16) 
Thus, a two-qubit state for a single-qubit data is sufficient, on average (Acín, Jané 
and Vidal, 2000), (Kim et al., 2002).  
4.4   Entropy of secret angle states 
We have seen that, on average, a two-qubit state is sufficient to store and retrieve 
any angle state. In this Section we step forward, and we claim that we can store 
the unitary operation  with arbitrary, unknown q  angle using on average less 
than four quantum bits, if   The rotation operator  for arbitrary  
can be implemented by a sequence of operations of the form  with binary 
angles 
q
0 q p£ £ . q

q
kq
2 .kk =
k N=
q p  Thus, we can consider the implementation of  for a certain 
 and 
kq
2 .NNq p= The required  set of N states is ρN
{ 12 2, , ,NN N Nq q q-   }ρN =  where the corresponding probabilities are 
given by 11 2llp
-=  for the  state. If Alice retrieves the original angle state  
each step can be considered independently and involves with probability 
thl ,q
1 2p  
either the storage of the state 
=
12N
N
q-  for the  step (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 
2000).  
thl
( ) (2 1The entropy is ) ( )2log log 1 ,j j jx x - - jx x= - -S j  where 
( )1 cos 2j jx q= + ,  and 2 .jjq p= That is, the total number of quantum states 
required to store and retrieve the angle q  or the operation 
Nq  is given by 
1
1
1
.
2
N
N l l
l
- -=
åS  The total number of quantum states needed to store and retrieve 
the angle state, with arbitrary   for 1  is on average given 
by 
,q 0 ,pq£ £ ,k£ £ ¥
1
1 0 1
1
2 4.k £S
2
k
k l
k l k
¥ - ¥
= = =
£å å åS  That is, less than four quantum states per angle 
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state are required on average to store an arbitrary, unknown operation of the form 
 and in the previous sections we have seen that on average two qubits suffice 
to implement  (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000). 
,q
q
4.5    Distribution of quantum copy protected data medium 
Alice will be able to obtain the result of the l-length decryption operation ( )lq  and 
the n-length decrypted data state ( ) ( )l ndq  only if the Issuer puts at least a two 
state length string 2 11 2
i
i q q-=Ä = Ä 2q   on the data medium for decryption.  
This means that Alice, or anyone who buys an original quantum copy-protected 
data medium, has to be able to compute the secret decrypting unitary operator 
( )l
q  on an n-qubit data string ( )nd . The Issuer puts both data qubits ( )nd  
and key states ( )lq  on the data medium, and Alice operates the decrypting 
rotation ( ) ( )l ndq , but she has no information about what the secret unitary 
operation ( )lq  was (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000). Thus, the Issuer doesn’t want 
Alice to know what secret decrypting algorithm she is running on her reader 
device. The secret key states of the l-length state ( )lq  are non-orthogonal states, 
because Alice can in principle distinguish between orthogonal states (Nielsen, 
Chuang, 2000). If Alice tries to copy ( )lq , then she will necessarily modify the 
key state, which will result in an incorrect decrypted state (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 
2000). That is, it is not possible for Alice to copy, even in an approximate form, 
the secret key state or to decrypt the data states. An N-qubit length unknown 
state Nq  has maximal entropy, thus ,2 2
N
N Nd
q q
q
p
Äæ ö÷ç= ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øò
1   where 
2
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø
1  is 
the maximally mixed state (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000). Let assume  be the 
probability of a successful transformation 
pq
dq = q , which is independent of 
data state .d  The quantity to be maximized is 
2
d
p pq
q
p= ò , the average 
probability of success (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000). If we choose a random angle 
 and transform the state )0,2éë0q Î p Nq , our state will change to 0Nq q+ . This 
can be achieved if the state Nq  is transformed by 
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0 0 0 0
1 2 3 ,Nq q q q
-Ä Ä Ä Ä    1  we then obtain 
0
dq q+ . We have the state 
0
dq q+  and finally we eliminate  by performing  on 0q 0
†
q 0 dq q+  (Acín, 
Jané and Vidal, 2000). Let us assume that our data state ,d b=  so that 
.q b q b= +  The transformation is unitary, thus if  
then 
* *,b p b q q= + + -
*
* N N
qqb b =  ( ) *b qqc c1 ,p b-  and *† qqb  * 0b =  (Acín, Jané 
and Vidal, 2000).  
In Figure 10 we show the probability success as a function of the length of the 
key qubit string. The vertical axis represents the probability of success, the 
horizontal axis shows the length of the input qubit string. 
 
Figure 10   Probability of success of decryption process as a function of length of 
key qubit string 
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If we take ( )* 1 2 Nq q p- =  then ( )1 1 2 Np £ - ,  and this is what we wanted to 
show. Thus, if retrieving an angle state q  encoded in N qubits as Nq  the 
method necessarily fails with probability ( )1 2 Ne = (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000).  
4.6    The hash quantum state 
Let us assume that the secret decryption key  and the i-th data state are stored 
on the quantum-based data medium in quantum states 
D
D
y  and id . Alice has 
to generate a single-qubit hash state from the states of the decryption key and then 
she has to apply it to a fixed data qubit. Finally, she has to compare it with the 
validated result.  
The secret key 1 2D ny q q= Ä Ä Ä q   is an n-bit length string, where the 
i-th bit of the key is cos 0 sin 1i i iq q q= + . Only the Issuer knows the secret 
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)0,2iq éÎ ë p  rotation angle, thus only the Issuer is able to produce the right hash 
state (
D
f y  )  from these rotation angles. The hash quantum state ( )Df y   
of the secret key is a single qubit state, and it can be generated using 
( )
1 2
.
D n
f dq q qy = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅      Here  is the rotation operator, which is 
realized by the i-th quantum state 
iq
iq  of the decryption key, and d  is the fixed 
data state for the verification process. For simplicity, here we assume both the 
data quantum state and resulting hash quantum state are single qubit states 
(Nielsen, Chuang, 2000). In Figure 11, we show the case if the original hash state is 
stored by the Issuer. After the Issuer receives the computed hash state 
1 2 n
dq q q⋅ ⋅ ⋅   , he compares it with the original, stored hash state 
( )
D
f y  . 
 
Figure 11   Generation and verification of hash quantum state 
 
Verification of 
hash
quantum state
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Key state #2
Quantum Data Medium
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
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The secret decryption key 
D
y  contains n quantum states 
1 2 nq q qÄ Ä Ä , where every  rotation is realized by an l-length multi-
qubit string, therefore every secret transformation  on the corresponding data 
qubit 
iq
iq
d  can be implemented with probability of success   The 
elements of the quantum medium authentication process – the secret key 
( )1 1 / 2 l- .
D
y , 
the valid hash of the key ( )
D
f y   and the data state for the verification process 
d  –  are stored on the data medium. In the verification process, Alice first 
chooses the corresponding data state d . She uses this state as the control of a 
CNOT-gate (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000). The target consists of all of the states of the 
key 
D
y . In order to implement a successful verification process, Alice has to 
generate a valid hash state ( )
D
f y   from the secret key states. First, Alice takes 
the data state d  for the verification and applies the first transformation . 
1q
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After she measures 1q , she takes the next secret key qubit 2q , and applies  
on the state 
2q
1
dq , and so on. 
 
Figure 12   Generation process of hash quantum angle state. Every angle state 
rotates the previous state by a certain angle. After the rotations, the Issuer 
identifies the quantum data medium 
                
 
We assume that the length of the key is n, so she finally takes the n-th qubit 
nq  of the key, and she gets the appropriate state  1 2 n dq q q⋅ ⋅ ⋅    which is 
equal to (
D
f y  )  iff all of the key states are valid. In Figure 13, we show the 
preparation of the hash state using a single-qubit data qubit d .  
Figure 13   The preparation of the hash state on single-qubit data. The i-th 
rotation operator is realized by the key state which is stored in a multi-qubit string 
M
1 2 n
d      d
1
2 M2
1n  M1n 
n Mn
  
1
 
 
Once the hash state 
1 2 n
dq q q⋅ ⋅ ⋅    is generated from the secret key and the 
fixed data qubit, Alice uses a simple controlled-SWAP gate (Nielsen, Chuang, 
2000). The two inputs of the controlled-SWAP gate are the generated hash state 
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1 2 n
dq q q⋅ ⋅ ⋅    and the original hash state ( Df y  ) , which is stored on 
the data medium. The gate is shown in Figure 14. 
Figure 14   The controlled-SWAP gate (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) test to check the 
prepared hash state 
                   
SWAP
d
1 2 n
d      
H
 Df  
MH
                                                                
 
If we assume that the two inputs f  and y  are equal, then the output of the 
gate is 0, with probability 
( )( ) 21Pr 0 , , , , .
2 2
f y y f f y y f y fé ù = + + = +ë û
1 1
2
 If it was the case 
that f y= , then we know that this answer is always correct because we will 
always measure 0. In Figure 15, the original hash state is denoted by 
(
D
fy y=   ) , the hash for verification process – computed from key angle 
states – is denoted by 
1 2 n
dq q qf = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅   . The angle between hash states 
y  and f  determines the probability of success of the SWAP test (Nielsen, 
Chuang, 2000).  
 
Figure 15   Distance between valid and invalid quantum state from a pirated disk 
    
 
In Figure 16, we illustrate the probability of success of a SWAP test-based 
(Nielsen, Chuang, 2000) hash state verification process. The vertical axis represents 
the probability of success of verification, the horizontal-axis represents the 
difference between the generated and original hash states. As can be concluded, if 
the hash states are equal f y= , then the SWAP test will determine the 
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validity with probability of success 1. Otherwise, if the two states are orthogonal to 
each other, then the result of the test becomes fully quantum probabilistic (Imre 
and Balazs, 2005), and if the Issuer measures 1, the received hash state will be 
rejected. In Figure 16, we show the probability of success for a one-qubit length 
quantum system. The probability of success of the SWAP test (Nielsen, Chuang, 
2000) increasing exponentially with the number of qubits in the hash string 
increases linearly (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000). 
 
Figure 16   Probability of success of SWAP test as a function of the distance 
between the valid hash state and invalid quantum state for a one-qubit length 
environment 
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As can be concluded, for an n-length quantum system, the probability of success of 
the test becomes  ( )Pr 0 1 1 / 2 .né ù = -ë û
4.7    Maximum distance between indistinguishable angle states 
We can derive the degree of orthogonality between the q  states, with error 
parameter . Using the general decryption operator , we 
get
e G
0d qÄ Äé ù =ë ûG  ( ) 1 ,dcd d dp d pq q q q qtÄ + -
.
 where 
 and 1  The state (1dpq e= - ) dpq e- = dq  only depends on d  through a 
term of order  where  for probabilistic gates (Nielsen, Chuang, 2000). 
Furthermore, for any two data states 
,te 1t =
1d  and 2d  the inner product is given by 
1 2d d = ( )1 2 ,d dd d tq q e 1 2 +  where the term  is linear in 
Thus, 
( )te
.te (1 e= + )1 2d d tq q  ,  that is (d tq q e= +   ).  Let us 
consider that we have an arbitrary d  quantum data state, and two unitary 
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angles  and  thus 1 2 , ( )†1 2 1 2 1 2R R .d d te=    +  The scalar 
product 1 2  does not depend on the quantum data d , therefore the 
dependence of †1 2 1 2R Rd d    on d  must be of order  at most 
(Acín, Jané and Vidal, 2000). Let us assume that , the distance between 
angles  and , is 
( te
)
)
1 2, D
(1 2 ( )( )1 2 †, 1 2  1 .Tr= - -   D 2   If the two angles 
 and  are very close, the largest variation of 1 2 †1 2R Rd d  in 
( )†1 2 2R Rd d te+1   for two different qubits is 
† †
1 2 1 21 R R 1 R Rn n- = 1 1 ,n nq q q q- = +  thus 21 n i
i
nq+ ³ =åq q  
1 2,
2 .n D  From this result, the angle states  and  are indistinguishable 
only if and  are also very close to each other, thus  If Alice is 
a dishonest user, she is unable to distinguish between them (Acín, Jané and Vidal, 
2000).  
1 2
1 2 1 2, 1. D
4.8    Security of medium verification method 
In summary, if Alice is a malevolent user and she wants to pass the verification 
process with a modified pirated disk, then:   
 she has to identify all the secret rotation angles 1q  to nq  of the key which 
is impossible according to the no-cloning theorem (Wootters and Zurek, 1982), 
or she has to generate a valid ( )
D
y   hash state from an invalid key f
*
D
y , which is also impossible  
 she has to try to use an invalid hash state together with an invalid key. In 
that case, the verification process accepts the invalid ( )* *y  hash state 
with the fake key. The data states on the disk with fake key 
D f
*
D
y  will be 
indecipherable.  
4.9   Multi-qubit decryption  
After the verification process has succeeded, Alice can use the states of the 
decryption key 
D
y  to rotate the encrypted data states in one-step, as shown in 
Figure 17.  
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Figure 17   Decryption of an n-length multi-qubit data string with an n-length 
multi-qubit key-string. Each state of the key is realized by an l-length multi-qubit 
string. The i-th secret angle state operates on the i-th data qubit 
M
1
d
1d
1
2 M2
1n  M1n 
n Mn
  
1
2
d
2d
1n
d 
1nd 
n
d
nd
  
 
If Alice has an n-bit length encrypted data string 1 nd Ä Ä d , she can decode 
it with the verified n-bit length key 1 2D ny q q= Ä Ä Ä q  in one-step. 
The decryption process can be realized by simple rotation transformations, hence 
the encrypted data states can be deciphered with high probability and high 
efficiency. All the rotation transformations are realized by an l-length multi-qubit 
string, therefore every secret transformation  on the corresponding data qubit 
iq
id  can be implemented with probability of success    ( )1 1 / 2 l- .
5   An experimental realization of quantum protected data 
medium 
In this section, we show one possible experimental realization of the proposed 
quantum copy protection scheme. Holographic data storage is a potential 
technology to realize quantum data medium. In holographic technologies, each bit 
is stored as optical changes on the surface of the holographic data disk. Moreover, 
holographic storage is capable of reading millions of quantum bits in parallel, hence 
the verification of the quantum data medium can be attained much more 
effectively (Chuang et al., 2008). 
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The presented quantum data medium could be implemented in practice by a 
transmission-reflective type holographic optical disk and the readout process could 
be carried out by a holographic reader device. The rotation process uses a quantum 
CPU, implemented inside the reader device.  
Figure 18   An experimental realization of the quantum copy-protection system 
Quantum-CPU
 
 
In the proposed model, the  and  Pauli-transformations could be 
realized by holographic and optical elements. With the help of these optical 
elements, an arbitrary unitary quantum transformation could be prepared 
effectively (Chuang et al., 2008).  
,X Ys s Zs
5.1. The holographic optical data medium 
The quantum protected data medium is an information carrier that includes 
information in the form of a hologram. In order to increase protection against 
copying, the implemented hologram is the combination of a transmission hologram 
and a reflection hologram. The data and the key states on the quantum protected 
medium are encoded holographically. The object state is equal to the encoded data 
or key quantum state, while the reference state is equivalent to its orthogonal 
state.  
Figure 19 The reflective transmission holographic optical disk 
 
Such information carriers frequently serve as security seals for characterizing 
trademark products. The layer structure of reflective transmission holographic 
optical disk is illustrated in Figure 19.  
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6   Conclusions and future work  
This paper introduces a fundamentally new method for protecting classical data by 
quantum states. The software Issuer stores the classical data in quantum states on 
the original distributed quantum-based data medium. The classical data on the 
data medium can be read out easily by anyone, but these classical bits are encoded 
bits. The decoding key rotates the angles of the quantum bits, thus some qubit 
values remain unchanged while some quantum states rotate to reverse their value 
and therefore the projected values of the classical bits.  The absolute security of 
the proposed method rests on the laws of quantum dynamics. The operations can 
be implemented with some associated error, which decreases exponentially with the 
number of quantum states of the angle state. In further analysis of the proposed 
quantum-based data protection system, we would like to make an in-depth study 
of the applicability of quantum cloning machines, which can be used to produce 
the clones of quantum states.  
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